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Will a more tightly aligned system become the exclusive coordination or governance 
system in the pork industry? The analysis shows that the packer prefers to source hogs 
from both an aligned market and an independent market.  This result is because the 
packer, facing variability in the demand for premium pork, must balance the cost of 
higher quality aligned hogs and independent hogs against the states of nature for 
demand for the premium product. 
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Supply chains have been a dominant focus of both academic research and 
business strategy in the food and agribusiness industries for the past decade.  Much 
discussion, analysis and experimentation with various forms of vertical alignment 
using governance structures such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, contracts, and 
other non-open market arrangements has occurred. 
The U.S. pork industry exemplifies this experimentation and transformation 
with more tightly aligned supply chains.  The traditional organization of the hog 
production slaughter and processing system, characterized by independent producers 
and open-market coordination with packers, is being replaced with production and 
marketing contracts, and packer owned and operated hog production facilities. 
The percentage of U.S. pork production under contract or vertical integration 
mechanisms rose from 11 percent in 1993 to 64 percent in 1999.  As the use of 
contracts for coordinating production has grown rapidly, so has the complex nature of 
these contracts.  Three general contract types have become widely used for pork 
production coordination with each sharing risks and rewards differently (Martin 
1999a, Lawrence 1999, and USDA 1996). The three dominant types of marketing 
contracts that have emerged are formula price agreements, price window contracts 
and contracts based on cost of production (Martin 1999a and 1999b). 
A critical argument for this tighter alignment in the pork supply chain is 
improved signaling to suppliers of the weight and leanness characteristics that are 
valued in the marketplace.  In open market coordinated systems, actual hog flows, in 
terms of volume and quality characteristics may differ from what packer’s desire.  
This mismatching is attributable in part to producers and packers having differing 
objectives.  Furthermore, the lack of information in a coordination mechanism can 
  1result in misalignment for production of output-specific characteristics in the short-
run (Cloutier).  When the product flow does not coincide with the information flow 
from pricing signals, the system’s profit may be sub-optimal, providing an 
opportunity to increase overall system profits by realigning product and information 
flows and incentives. 
Vertical integration and coordination may occur for several additional reasons 
including stable supplies, better quality control, improved flow scheduling, and 
reductions in price risk (Paarlberg et al, 1999.)  Several empirical studies have 
examined the structure and performance of various types of contracts and vertical 
integration in the pork industry including Hennessy and Lawrence (1999); Johnson 
and Foster (1999); Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga (2001); Martin (1997); 
Martinez (1999); and Rhoades (1995).  An additional motivation for interest in the 
implications of alternative vertical alignment or coordination systems is the recent 
debate and court case concerning captive suppliers (Smith, 2004).  The policy debate 
and litigation has focused fundamentally on concerns about the disappearance of open 
market transactions in the pork and beef industries, and whether or not 
packers/processors can and are using “captive supplies” (both livestock they own and 
feed and animals under longer term contracting arrangements) as a mechanism to 
manipulate prices and thus exercise monosopy power. 
  Theoretical arguments and empirical analyses suggest that there are economic 
efficiency incentives to develop tighter linkages between suppliers and buyers in a 
supply chain. But will a more tightly aligned system become the exclusive 
coordination or governance system – i.e. does vertical coordination sufficiently 
dominate open market transactions between suppliers and buyers such that those who 
do not vertically align eventually lose market access. Will open access markets 
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disappear?  Or is there an optimal mix of vertically aligned and open market sourcing 
strategies such that both will co-exist, and what characteristics of suppliers and buyers 
would result in this co-existence?  More specifically how do the interaction of 
different transactions costs with different coordination systems, variability in buyer 
demand for different quality attributes, variability in quality attributes provided by 
different suppliers, and cost structure of buyers and suppliers determine the optimal 
sourcing strategy and coordination system between suppliers and buyers? 
 
Conceptual Model of Packer/Producer Supply Chain Link  
Consider a market where Packer A works with two types of producers – those 
with long-term alignments with Packer A and independent producers.  The long-term 
alignments are meant to reflect anything from contracts through outright ownership of 
the production facilities.  Packer A faces demand for two products – premium pork 
and commodity pork.  (For purposes of developing an analytical model, we abstract 
from the disassembly process of carcasses into primal cuts.)  Demand for premium 
pork is perfectly inelastic, but the quantity demanded is not known for certain at the 
time the long-term alignments must be committed.  Demand for commodity pork is 
perfectly elastic. 
The aligned and independent producers produce animals suitable for 
producing premium pork and commodity pork in different proportions. The fraction 
of animals from an aligned producer that is suitable for premium pork is
a
p f , and the 





c f f − =1 .  The analogous fractions for the independent producer are denoted 
i
p f  
and
i
c f .  Premium inputs can be used to producer commodity pork, but the reverse is 
not possible.  One of the selection criteria for the aligned producers is that they can   4




p f .  When Packer A acquires animals from either type of producer, they must 
purchase the entire distribution of animals – not just the ones suitable for producing 
premium pork. 
For modeling purposes, the packer has lower and upper limits on the number 
of hogs that must be processed each week QBl
B and QBu
B.  Within these bounds, Packer A 
must satisfy the demand for the premium pork product if possible.  If they do not have 
sufficient supplies of quality animals to produce the premium pork, then they can 
purchase additional animals from independent producers.  If they have excess supplies 
of quality animals to produce premium pork, then the excess premium pork must be 
sold in the commodity market.  Denote the quantity of animals purchased from 
aligned producers by QP
a
P, and the quantity purchased from independent producers by 
QP
i
P.  If demand for premium pork is denoted by D (expressed in animal equivalent 
units), then the quantity that must be purchased from independent producers is given 
by: 
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  If the price for premium and commodity pork are denoted by pBp
B and pBc
B, the 
costs of acquisition and processing for aligned and independent producers are denoted 
by 
a
A c , 
a
A e , 
i
A c , and 
i
A e , and if πBA
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The first term denotes the revenue for the premium pork.   The next term denotes the 
revenue for commodity pork.  Inside the square brackets for this term, the first   5
expression is the quantity of commodity animals purchased from aligned producers, 
the second term is the quantity of commodity animals purchased from independent 
producers, and the third term is equal to any excess purchases of premium quality 
animals beyond what is needed to satisfy the demand for premium products.  This 
term will only be positive in the cases where QP
i
P equals zero, indicating that no 
additional purchases to obtain more premium animals were necessary, and where 
purchases from aligned producers exceeded the premium needs.  The final two terms 
on the right-hand side of the equation are the total costs for acquisition and processing 
of animals from aligned and independent producers. 
  Combining (1) and (2) yields  
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(3) 
From the expression (3), it begins to become apparent why the packer might benefit 
from having access to both the aligned and independent producers.  When demand for 
premium pork is high, the packer can acquire hogs from independent producers to fill 
the demand quota.  This acquisition may be costly due to the relatively large amount 
of commodity pork that the packer will have to purchase and dispose of, potentially at 
a loss. 
The reason for the potential losses despite the assumed perfectly elastic 
demand for commodity pork arises because there is competition for the output of the 
independent producers.  To reflect this phenomenon, we introduce a second packer, 
Packer B, who competes with Packer A for hogs supplied by the independent   6
producers.  Independent producers supply hogs to either Packer A or B in response to 
the offered prices net of delivery costs.   
To reflect the spatial aspect of this competition, we consider the producers to 
be distributed uniformly between Packer A and Packer B, which are separated by 
distance X.  Prior to aligned arrangements, the situation is as follows.  Each producer 
is treated as having a single unit of animals to deliver, and a producer is identified by 
her distance to Packer A, which is denoted by x, where 0 U<U x U<U X.  If the cost of 
transport per animal per unit of distance is d, and if we denote the acquisition cost that 
Packer A pays by 
i
A c  and the acquisition cost that Packer B pays by 
i
B c , then producer 




A − − ≥ − , then the producer delivers 
to Packer A, and otherwise delivers to Packer B.  The critical distance such that 
producers closer to Packer A deliver to Packer A and producers further away deliver 
to Packer B is defined by: 






A + − =
2
1 * .        ( 4 )  
So if the total number of animals in the competitive acquisition area for Packers A 
and B is KX, then the total supply to Packer A is defined by: 
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and the supply to Packer B is 
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As one might expect, if the acquisition costs for Packers A and B are equal, then the 
supply to each packer is half of the total, or KX/2. 
  The choice of acquisition cost for Packer B is defined by the following profit 
maximization problem where the acquisition cost is restricted to be non-negative and   7
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which, assuming an interior solution, means 
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A c      (8) 
To find equilibrium acquisition costs for both Packer A and B, (8) is solved 





P = 0 where SBA
B is defined by (5), 
and QP
i
P is defined by (1).  The solution to this system is 
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The acquisition cost for Packer A from independent producers is a random variable 
through D.  This is the situation in the absence of an aligned market.  To motivate the 
choice process by producers of whether to operate independently or to develop an 
aligned relationship with the packer, producers are additionally differentiated by their 
level of risk aversion.    The nature of the aligned relationship is that Packer A 
provides aligned producers with a fixed payment, 
a
A c .  There is a critical level of risk 
aversion such that more risk averse producers prefer the aligned arrangement, and less 
risk averse producers prefer to remain independent.  This risk aversion level satisfies 
the following equation: 
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where 
i
A c  is defined as in (9).  Those producers that choose the aligned arrangement 
effectively leave the pool of producers where Packers A and B must compete.  Thus, 
the model described in (4)-(9) must be adjusted by reducing K by QP
a
PPP. and reflecting 
that 0 ≠
a Q  is possible in (1).  The modified equations are as follows: 
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Producers are assumed to choose the contract market compared to independent 
production, open access markets based on their expectations of future open market 
prices, and that contract arrangements do not impact open market prices or price 
variability.  Total supply variability is not considered in this stylized version of the 
model.  This allows for variability in demand by type of product and proportion of 
hogs sourced from independent versus contract producers depending on variability in 
souring costs to be isolated. 
  For purposes of illustration, we assume that D is uniformly distributed 
between some lower and upper bounds (i.e., over the interval [DBl
B,DBu
BBB]).  The expected profits as defined in (3) with   defined as in (9’) are calculated via Monte Carlo 
simulation.  Results are presented in the next section.  Sensitivities of the results are 
explored for changes in the variability of demand, changes in supply of live hogs, 
changes in the mean demand, changes in producer risk preferences, and changes in 





  The Monte Carlo Simulation model is parameterized to reflect a typical 
Midwest packer with a slaughtering capacity of 14,500 head per day.  Table 1 
summarizes the inputs for the model.  The packer is assumed to have contract 
relationships with producers who producea higher proportion of host that meet the 
premium product specifications (75 percent) than hogs purchased in the independent 
market (65 percent).  Packer processing costs are assumed to be $41 per head for 
aligned hogs (Hayenga (1998)).  The model assumes processing costs of $43 per head 
for independent hogs due to the increase in variability of independent hogs.  The 
competing packer has processing costs of $44 per head.  The cost of delivery is based 
on Lawrence and Vontalge (2001) at $1.65 per head for hogs furthest from the 
competing packer.  The price of commodity pork was estimated at $188.00 per live 
hog equivalent based on Poray (2001).  Premium pork product was assumed to be 10 
percent higher than commodity pork at $208.80 per live hog equivalent.  Other model 
parameters will be used as sensitivity variables and are described in the results that 
follow. 
Table 2 summarizes the results from the simulation analysis.  Initially the 
model will assume that there are 174,000 total hogs in the market from which the 
packer chooses to contract.  The first group of results assumes that the producer and 
the packer are both risk neutral, profit maximizers.  In the first line of results, the 
  9packer faces a uniform distribution of premium product demand that ranges from 
32,625 head to 76,125 head.  In this first scenario, the packer chooses to contract 
32,874 head at a price of $145.07 per head. On average, the packer also purchases 
45,722 head from the independent market with a standard deviation of 19,317 head.  
The average price of independent hogs is $139.94 with a standard deviation of $1.39.  
Expected profit is $1.28 million in this scenario.  This first scenario indicates, clearly, 
that the packer in this stylized situation prefers to have both aligned and independent 
hogs in its sourcing portfolio.   
The next two rows of Table 2 illustrate what happens to the packer’s decisions 
and acquisition cost of hogs when the variability in premium pork demand is reduced.  
Both the upper and lower values of demand are changed in these scenarios so that 
mean demand of premium product remains constant.  As variability is reduced, the 
packer chooses to increase the number of aligned hogs contracted and reduce the 
expected number of independent hogs purchased.  The increase in contracted hogs 
also reduces the standard deviation of independent hogs purchased because there are 
fewer states of nature where the packer needs the independent hogs to fill demand for 
premium product.    The contract price rises slightly to entice more hogs into the 
aligned situation.  Despite the reduction in demand for independent hogs the expected 
cost of independent hogs actually rises because more hogs have been removed from 
the independent market and placed in the aligned market.  Finally, the packer enjoys 
higher expected profits when the variability in demand for the premium product 
declines. 
Lines four and five of Table 2 summarize the results of increasing the supply 
of hogs and increasing the expected demand of premium product respectively.  When 
the supply of live hogs increases the packer increases the amount of hogs aligned and 
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reduces the expected number of independent hogs purchased.  The increase in supply 
of hogs lowers the cost of both aligned and independent hogs making it cheaper for 
the packer to entice hogs into the aligned market.  Increasing demand while holding 
supply constant results in an increase in both aligned and independent hog purchases.  
However, there is a greater increase in the number of independent hogs purchased to 
meet the 10,000 head increase in premium demand.  This is because the increase in 
demand causes aligned hog costs to increase faster than independent hog costs. 
The three lines in table 3 labeled “Producer Risk Aversion” summarize the 
results when suppliers in the market place are differentiated by risk aversion.  In this 
scenario, risk aversion, ρ ,  is assumed to be 1 for the most risk averse supplier.  Each 
successive supplier added to the aligned market for the packer would have a slightly 
lower risk aversion coefficient causing the packer to pay more to entice the next 
supplier into the aligned market.  In the extreme, the last supplier in the market would 
be risk neutral.  This scenario reflects the value of eliminating the variability of 
market prices for the producer when they choose to enter the aligned market.  When 
producer risk aversion is introduced, the price that must be paid to entice aligned 
production decreases.  This causes the number of hogs to be aligned to increase when 
comparing to the first three lines of table 2.  However, as the variability of demand for 
premium product declines the number of hogs the packer chooses to align actually 
decreases (the number of aligned hogs increased when producers where assumed to be 
risk neutral).  This is because the marginal cost of aligning the next supplier is higher 
than in the risk neutral scenario because the next hog must be compensated for both 
the marginal transportation cost and the marginal change in certainty equivalent value. 
The final three lines in table 3 introduce risk aversion to the packer’s profit 
function.  The packer is assumed to maximize the certainty equivalent value of profits from Myer’s (1987) mean/variance approximation of the certainty equivalent value.  
For illustrative purposes, the packer’s risk aversion coefficient is assumed to be 1.  
Supplier risk aversion is the same as in the last section.  Thus, this scenario is best 
compared to the “Producer Risk Aversion” scenario.  When the packer is assumed to 
be risk averse the number of aligned hogs is reduced and the expected number of 
independent hogs is increased.  The cost of aligned and independent hogs is slightly 
lower in this scenario but the number of hogs demanded in total is similar to the 
number of hogs demanded in the producer risk aversion scenario.  The risk averse 
packer scenario indicates the packer’s desire to reduce the risk of having too many 
aligned hogs when demand is low.  The risk averse packer is more willing to use the 
independent hog market to fill demand for the variable premium market despite the 
lower quality of hogs in the independent market.  As the variability in the independent 
market declines, the risk averse packer will increase the number of aligned hogs and 
reduce expected purchases from the independent hog market. 
Conclusions 
  The supply chain between pork packers and producers continues to move 
towards a more tightly aligned system.  This research explored the packers desire to 
maintain a portfolio of aligned and independent pork production markets when facing 
a variable demand for premium products.  Despite the fact that the quality of aligned 
hogs was assumed to be higher than hogs in the independent market, the analysis 
shows that the packer prefers to source hogs from both markets.  There are two 
primary reasons for the desire to maintain both markets.  First, the cost of aligned 
hogs is generally higher than the cost of independent hogs, reflecting the quality 
differential, and the need to attract producers from the independent market.  Second, 
facing variability in the demand for premium pork causes the packer to face states of 
  12nature where demand maybe low relative to the number of hogs the packer chooses to 
align.  If the packer aligns too many hogs, the cost of acquisition would be too high 
relative to the amount of production that would have to be sold in the commodity pork 
market.  On the other hand, if the packer aligns too few hogs, then in states of nature 
where demand is high the packer has to compete heavily for independent hogs, 
driving up the cost of hogs in that market.  The packer must seek a balance where the 
cost of aligned hogs and independent hogs is balanced again the states of nature for 
demand for the premium product. 
  Sensitivity analysis revealed a number of interesting results.  In particular, 
increases in the supply of hogs causes the packer to increase the amount of aligned 
hogs at the expense of the number of independent hogs.  But, increases in demand for 
premium pork, while increasing the packers demand for both types of hogs, actually 
increase the demand more for independent hogs.  When producer risk aversion is 
introduced, the packer aligns more hogs at a cheaper price.  But, the packer will align 
fewer hogs as demand variability declines.  Finally, when the packer is assumed to be 
risk averse, the number of aligned hogs is generally lower because of the risk of 
having too many hogs aligned when demand for premium products is low.  As the 
variability of demand reduces the packer chooses to align more hogs.  Yet, in all 
sensitivities the packer continues to prefer to have an independent market available to 
minimize the cost of sourcing hogs and to reduce the risk of not having enough hogs 
to fill demand. 
  The model used in this analysis is highy stylized.  As such, the results are 
reflective of the assumptions used.  Further research is warranted to determine the 
impact of the variability in the number of hogs available in the market place.  It is 
expected that this variability would increase the expected cost and variability of cost 
  13of acquiring hogs in the open market.  This might lead to the packer choosing to align 
a larger number of hogs.  Other research should be conducted to determine the impact 
of multiple product demands and the ability of the packer to segment, select, and sort 
various types of hogs to meet these multiple demands. 
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  16Variable Name  Variable 
Symbol 
Value 
Fraction of Independent Hogs that meet 
Premium Product Specifications 
i
p f   0.65 
Fraction of Aligned Hogs that meet 











  0.75 
Delivers Costs per Head Per Unit of 
Distance 
d 1.65 
Processing Costs for Contract Hogs    41.00 
Processing Costs for Independent Hogs    43.00 
Processing Costs for Competing Packer    44.00 
Price of Commodity Product (per head)    188.00 
Price of Premium Product (per head)    208.60 
Maximum Plant Capacity (Head)    101,500 
Minimum Plant Capacity (Head)    32,625 
 
 
Table 1.  Exogenous Fixed Parameters 
17Table 2.  Impact of Changes in the Variance of Demand, Supply, Expected Demand, Producer Risk Aversion and Packer Risk Aversion
Lower Demand Upper Demand















Risk Neutral Impact of Reducing Risk
32625 76125 174000 32874 45722 (19317) 145.07 139.94 (1.39) 1278510
42625 66125 174000 33524 44972 (10436) 145.10 141.00 (0.75) 1297490
48125 60625 174000 33717 44750 (5551) 145.10 141.60 (0.40) 1303116
Increase in Supply of Hogs
48125 60625 203000 36884 41095 (5551) 144.16 140.98 (0.34) 1364166
Increase in Expected Demand
58125 70625 174000 35437 58150 (5551) 146.31 142.61 (0.41) 1446624
Producer Risk Aversion
3
32625 76125 174000 37077 40837 (19317) 144.54 139.61 (1.43) 1303183
42625 66125 174000 35790 42358 (10436) 144.81 140.84 (0.77) 1310667
48125 60625 174000 34919 43363 (5551) 144.95 141.52 (0.41) 1310040
Packer Risk Aversion with Producer Risk Aversion
4
32625 76125 174000 31421 47399 (19317) 144.32 140.05 (1.38) 1299906
42625 66125 174000 32742 45875 (10436) 144.69 141.05 (0.75) 1309707
48125 60625 174000 33302 45228 (5551) 144.89 141.62 (0.40) 1309768
1Numbers in parantheses are the standard deviation of independent hogs purchased by the packer.
2Numbers in parantheses are the standard deviation of the price of independent hogs.
3The Risk Aversion Coefficient is different for each producer and ranges from 0 to 1 uniformly across the total units of hogs in the market.
4The Packer is assumed to maximize the mean/variance approximation of its certainty equivalent with a risk aversion coefficient of 1.  